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1,403,403,eco,eng,20211119,20211225,2,Hannu Nurmi: Models of Political Economy
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10,2,1 Introduction
10,h.Political Economy is to the State what domestic economy is to the family. …[Political economy] has two grand objects, the Consumption of the Community, and that Supply upon which the consumption depends.
11,h,Smith’s view the task of political economy is to assist the rulers in providing well-being to their subjects and in securing the necessary means for running what would today be called the public sector. In Mill’s definition, what distinguishes political economy from household economy are the actors, not the activities. Both economies depend on the satisfaction of consumption and supply needs.
11,h.In Marx’s view it was rather the economic organization with its production relationships that determined the individual interests.
12,h,The neoclassical view of political economy agrees with the classic one in treating the economy as an analytically separable subsystem of the society, but introduces new philosophical and technical elements. To wit, the foundations of economic behavior were sought in the utilitarianism and marginal calculus was invented to explain the workings of the economies (see Caporaso and Levine 1992: 79–99).
12,h,Most definitions, however, share the idea of an interaction of two conceptually distinct societal subsystems – the political subsystem and the economic one.
14,h,We shall define political economy as the application of means–ends reasoning to behavior in the public realm.
16,h,The crucial concept of this text is that of decision. Political economy consists of structures, events, developments and patterns in which human decisions play a central role.
17,3,1.1 Suggested reading
19,2,2 What are we aiming at?
19,3,2.1 Explaining political economy
25,3,2.2 Building theories
27,h,Theories have thus a double role in scholarly work: they present the achieved results (laws) in condensed form and, with the aid of empirical observations, allow for the evaluation of our knowledge.
28,3,2.3 Models
29,h,speaking of a model rather than a theory, the person ipso facto believes that the description given in the model is not literally true, but a useful approximation.
29,h,Theoretical models include mathematical, statistical and computational ones.
30,h,the same study object may be modeled in several different ways depending on the use of the model (prediction, explanation or simulating past behavior)
31,3,2.4 Interpreting acts
33,3,2.5 Normative and factual models
36,3,2.6 Suggested reading
37,2,3 Homo æconomicus
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37,3,3.1 The role of assumptions in theory
43,3,3.2 Aspects of rationality
44,h,Thus, thick rationality essentially extends the notion of rationality by imposing conditions upon goals and beliefs.
46,3,3.3 Making choices under certainty
51,3,3.4 Choices under risk
58,3,3.5 Choices under uncertainty
64,3,3.6 Axioms of rational behavior
78,3,3.7 Suggested reading
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80,3,4.1 Classic paradoxes
91,3,4.2 The prospect theory
96,3,4.3 Further anomalies
104,3,4.4 Suggested reading
79,2,4 Economic man under attack
105,2,5 Games: descriptions and solutions
112,3,5.2 Strategies and extensive form
116,3,5.3 Solutions
130,3,5.4 Subgames and trembles
136,3,5.5 Special games
156,3,5.6 Reputation makes a difference
162,3,5.7 … and much hinges upon the quality of information
167,3,5.8 The role of two-person game theory
171,3,5.9 Suggested reading
173,2,6 Bargaining and coalitions
173,3,6.1 Classic solutions
185,3,6.2 Stability, core and bargaining sets
192,3,6.3 Values for n-person games
197,3,6.4 Applications to European institutions
200,3,6.5 Power and preferences
205,3,6.6 Suggested reading
207,2,7 Decision making in committees
207,3,7.1 Basic concepts
209,3,7.2 Aggregating opinions
211,3,7.3 New systems, new winners
214,3,7.4 Theory of committee voting in the olden days
220,3,7.5 Problems of Condorcet’s intuition
222,3,7.6 Voting procedures
228,3,7.7 Choice procedures and performance criteria
229,3,7.8 Two social choice theorems
232,3,7.9 Voting as a game
242,3,7.10 Suggested reading
244,2,8 Designing for elections and public goods provision
246,3,8.1 The majority rule
251,3,8.2 Majority and plurality
254,3,8.3 Single transferable vote
257,3,8.4 Quota and divisor methods
261,3,8.5 Proportionality of what?
264,3,8.6 The general design problem
267,3,8.7 Optimizing the public goods provision
275,3,8.8 Suggested reading
277,2,9 What kind of government?
277,3,9.1 States as bandits
279,3,9.2 A just state
285,3,9.3 Redistribution and rent seeking
287,3,9.4 Suggested reading
289,2,10 Aspects of policy evaluation
289,3,10.1 Deciding the number of criteria
291,3,10.2 Majorities, positions, weights
293,3,10.3 Changes in alternative sets
295,3,10.4 Close and yet so far
298,3,10.5 One more criterion cannot do any harm, can it?
301,3,10.6 Forest and the trees
306,3,10.7 Voters are much the same as criteria
308,3,10.8 Suggested reading
309,2,11 Homo æconomicus: should we let him go?
313,2,Notes
323,2,Bibliography
403,2,End
### 20211225 2*
#eng No deal for me
This is not my kind of cake. An essay of deterministic models of political behavior. I could not get any touch of it. Therefore no chance for writing a review.
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Nurmi, Hannu. Models of Political Economy (p. 19). Taylor and Francis. Kindle Edition.